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 As a global response to piracy off the coast of Somalia was taking place, alarm bells were ringing about a similar growing insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea� 
Today, the Gulf of Guinea stands as the most dangerous maritime area in terms 
of the success rate of attacks and violence� The United Nations Security Council 
adopted Resolutions 2018 (in 2011) and 2039 (in 2012) expressing grave concern 
about the mounting insecurity in the region and its consequences for regional 
and global security�1 A United Nations (UN) team was deployed to the region to 
assess the situation�2 
The UN resolutions and the report of the assessment team called on regional 
states and institutions, as well as the international community, to respond, and 
a code of conduct for the repression of piracy was 
adopted by Gulf of Guinea states in June 2013 at 
Yaoundé, Cameroon, with wide international sup-
port�3 Nevertheless, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea 
region remains a serious threat� Indeed, in the 
month following the adoption of the code of con-
duct a Maltese-flagged vessel, Cotton, was hijacked 
off the coast of Gabon, the first attack of its kind 
along that coast, portending a widening of the pi-
racy threat southward�4 It is also noteworthy that at 
the close of 2013 the Gulf of Guinea recorded more 
incidents of attacks on the high seas than in previ-
ous years�5 This deepening threat has continued 
into 2014, as Angola and Ghana registered their 
first significant hijackings (analyzed below)� These 
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developments reinforce the urgency of effective counterpiracy measures� Real-
istically, however, the success and efficacy of both regional and global response 
will depend on a sound knowledge of the operational environment, awareness of 
the actors, and most crucially, understanding of how the situation has evolved� 
This article provides a critical analysis of the piracy situation in the Gulf of 
Guinea� It sets the background with an overview of piracy statistics and a catego-
rization of the coast according to the degree of risk of attack� This is followed by 
an examination of the paradigm of Gulf of Guinea piracy, while the third section 
analyzes the evolution of the piracy from its pre-2005 low levels into a regional 
and global threat� The fourth section summarizes Gulf of Guinea piracy and ex-
amines future projections� The article concludes with a discussion of the imper-
atives for enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea� It should be noted 
first that the geographical scope of the region referred to as the Gulf of Guinea 
varies depending on the issue or interest at stake� It is defined in this article as 
comprising the coastal states stretching from Senegal to Angola and as embracing 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS)�6
OVERVIEW AND DISTRIBUTION OF GULF OF GUINEA PIRACY 
INCIDENTS
Piracy has historically been a threat to maritime trade and the good order of the 
world’s oceans�7 To ensure the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), 
international law imposes an obligation on states to cooperate in the repression 
of piracy; it also grants universal jurisdiction over piracy, such that pirates may 
be arrested and prosecuted within the legal system of any state�8 The requisite 
international framework is codified in articles 100–105 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), of 1982�9 
To be classified as piracy, an act of piracy or depredation must have taken place 
on the high seas�10 The “high seas” in this context include contiguous zones and 
exclusive economic zones� In contrast to piracy, the terms “armed robbery against 
ships,” “armed robbery at sea,” or simply “armed robbery” denote piratical acts 
or thefts that take place within a territorial sea, internal waters, or, by extension, 
archipelagic waters, ports, and anchorages�11 For practical purposes, however, 
piracy and armed robbery pose similar threats to the safety and security of global 
shipping, and the drivers and motivations behind the two crimes are largely the 
same despite the legal distinction�12 For this reason “piracy” is used in this article 
to cover both types of incidents� 
Piracy Statistics in the Gulf of Guinea
Although the Gulf of Guinea has its own history of sea raids and piratical acts, 
they did not constitute a major threat until recently�13 Within the past few years 
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the region has seen a significant rise in piracy incidents� Table 1 reflects inci-
dents from 2005 to 2013, as compiled from International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) reports�14 
The rising threat of piracy is evident� Attacks went from twenty-three in 2005 
to sixty in 2007� For reasons that will be covered below, the incidents decreased 
in 2008 and 2009, but they swelled again between 2010 and 2013; 2012 marked a 
peak, with sixty-four incidents� The situation is actually worse than the statistics 
depict, because, it is believed, unlike in other regions, only about half of the inci-
dents of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea are actually reported by ships’ masters and 
operators for fear of reprisal during their next visit�15 Even so, since 2009 the Gulf 
of Guinea has been identified as the new piracy territory, displacing Somalia, 
especially with regard to violence employed in the attacks�16
Piracy constitutes a major threat to SLOC security when incidents are not 
confined to ports and anchorages but occur also in territorial waters and, more 
importantly, on the high seas� The Gulf of Guinea manifests all these indicators, 
and the percentage of successful attacks outside port areas has increased, as shown 
in table 1� Robberies and attempted robberies in the territorial sea rose from only 
five in 2005 to thirty-one incidents in 2007� The region recorded a single incident 
on the high seas in 2005; the number jumped tenfold the following year, and the 
number of successful attacks on the high seas has since grown� As early as 2006, 
pirates hijacked a Russian oil tanker, Shkotovo, about sixty nautical miles off Guin-
ea using automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), manifesting their 
ability to hijack vessels far out to sea and their willingness to employ high levels of 
violence�17 Significantly, seventeen out of the twenty-five high-seas attacks in 2012 
were successful, and most attacks in 2013 were against moving vessels� 
Piracy Hot Spots and Enclaves
Table 1 covers the entire Gulf of Guinea region, but two qualifications must be 
made� First, piracy and robbery incidents have not affected the entire region 
continually from 2005 to 2012� Second, even where incidents have been recorded, 
their nature and trends are not monolithic� To allow a nuanced perception of the 
dynamics of the problem, localities in the Gulf of Guinea can be categorized as 
“hot spots,” “enclaves,” or zones of low risk� Piracy hot spots are rated according 
to risk and danger of attacks, while enclaves—localities where pirates are based 
and from which they operate—are classified as primary or secondary, depending 
on the certainty of the presence of piratical groups�
Angola and Cape Verde are areas of low risk; there are hardly any reported 
incidents of attacks off their coasts, and the trends on the neighboring coasts are 
also limited—the hijacking of the tanker Kerala in February 2014 was the first 
major incident off Angola� Incidents in and around the Democratic Republic of 
Continued on page 97
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the Congo, the Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe, and Senegal are also limited to theft from ships 
in ports and anchorages, as well as occasional robberies in territorial seas� Attacks 
off the coasts of Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea have declined substantially 
since 2009, thus removing these two states from a high-risk ranking� 
Recent multiple attacks, in contrast, have made Cote d’Ivoire a piracy hot spot� 
Sierra Leone is in the same category, because although attacks off that coast are 
fewer than off Cote d’Ivoire, they are very violent� 
Guinea is both a piracy hot spot and the region’s secondary piracy enclave� 
Attacks off its coast since 2009 have been characterized by heavy use of weapons, 
violence, and sophistication� Shkotovo (as noted) and Maersk Belfast were at-
tacked in 2006 with automatic rifles and RPGs;18 Isola Verde and Songa Emerald 
were successfully boarded while under way in 2009 and 2010, respectively;19 
more recently, in 2012, armed pirates attacked the Maltese-flagged Constanza 
twenty nautical miles off Guinea, causing major damage to the ship�20 It is the 
frequency and similarity of these attacks that suggest the existence of a piracy 
base in Guinea and its environs� 
The coasts of Nigeria, Benin, and Togo are collectively the most dangerous in 
the region� However, Nigeria stands out as the epicenter of Gulf of Guinea piracy 
and as the primary piracy enclave� Nigeria alone accounts for 80 percent of re-
ported incidents of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea�21 
THE PARADIGM OF GULF OF GUINEA PIRACY 
What fundamentally drives piracy, especially in its primary enclave? Who are the 
primary actors responsible? Answers can be traced in the transmutation of an 
insurgency into a ravaging piracy network� 
The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is a loose coali-
tion of militant groups that emerged in 2005 in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, osten-
sibly seeking a greater share of oil revenue for the region�22 A Joint Revolutionary 
Council surfaced in 2006 as an umbrella organization for MEND and other, 
splinter groups;23 MEND is the most dominant and cohesive�24 MEND claims to 
fight for “community” interests, but intense criminality dominates its practical 
existence and activities�25 From its very inception, expatriate workers have been 
regularly kidnapped by MEND activists for ransom at each okrika—area or axis 
of control of a subunit or splinter group�26 
The MEND insurgency gained notoriety at the strategic level for attacks on 
critical installations in the Niger Delta, starting with oil pipelines ashore and 
later expanding to offshore oil platforms�27 The federal government of Nigeria 
responded with the establishment of a joint task force of security agencies to 
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counter the insurgency� Despite the robustness of the joint task force, MEND 
continued to be lethal, engaging government forces in gun battles�28 Three naval 
personnel were missing and feared dead in 2007, nine were killed in June 2008, 
and three in April 2009�29
Rising Threat and the Amnesty Pact 
In late 2008, after almost four years of insurgent attacks, the federal government 
of Nigeria entered into negotiations with MEND; a formal amnesty proclamation 
resulted in June 2009�30 This rapprochement was influenced by the increasing 
threat posed by insurgents to oil security, as epitomized by a successful attack on 
the floating production, storage, and off-loading unit (FPSO) Bonga in 2008�31 
The attack had serious implications for Nigeria, the wider Gulf of Guinea, and 
beyond� The Bonga attack marked a peak in a series of threats to energy security 
in the Gulf of Guinea, and it opened a new chapter in global asymmetric threats� 
Indeed, excluding the attack on Aban VII off the coast of India in 2006, the 
Gulf of Guinea has recorded the most attacks against offshore platforms in the 
world, all of them off the coast of Nigeria�32 Bulford Dolphin, a mobile drilling 
rig, was attacked in April 2007 by insurgents�33 In May 2007 Mystras was also 
attacked, and three days later Trident VIII was targeted�34 In addition to the 
physical damage and personal injuries inflicted by the insurgents, these incidents 
impacted the operation of the platforms�35 The attack on Mystras was indeed very 
significant, as it marked the second on an FPSO in two years� 
These incidents boosted the confidence of the insurgents, and they culmi-
nated in the June 2008 attack on the Bonga FPSO—a major hub of the oil giant 
Royal Dutch Shell—about 120 kilometers offshore�36 After the incident, Nigeria’s 
oil production dropped to its lowest in twenty-five years and global oil prices 
soared�37 The Bonga incident heightened global fears that even deep-sea energy 
installations were not safe from insurgents and terrorists�38 In a statement MEND 
affirmed that its grand objective was to disable oil export operations, described 
the attack as a humiliating security breach for the Nigerian military, and warned 
that MEND’s “next visit [would] be different�”39 Soon after, the Nigerian gov-
ernment and MEND group leaders came to the negotiation table and entered 
into an amnesty pact� The arrangement involved insurgents laying down their 
weapons in return for monthly allowances and skills training�40 However, some 
commentators have charged that insurgent leaders were accommodated in lux-
urious hotels alongside high-ranking politicians and influential people and that 
the insurgent leadership was to receive financial payoffs�41
The amnesty led to the demobilization of insurgent forces and of the organ-
izational structure of MEND, as well as a decline in its activities starting in late 
2008�42 Interestingly, in that period piracy attacks in the Gulf of Guinea decreased, 
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from a high of sixty incidents in 2007 to fifty in 2008, reaching a low of forty-six 
in 2009 (as shown in table 1)�43 A review of piracy reports by the International 
Maritime Bureau (IMB) for 2009 and 2010 shows that there were few piratical in-
cidents in the last and first quarters of 2009 and 2010, respectively�44 However, the 
arrangement became tenuous thereafter, partly because the amnesty “cake” had 
not been shared among all actors (and certainly not in amounts satisfactory to all 
members of the insurgency)�45 Splinter groups announced an intention to resume 
normal campaigns, and in the remainder of 2010 piracy attacks became preva-
lent once again�46 By the close of 2011 the Gulf of Guinea had recorded sixty- 
one piracy incidents, a sharp contrast to the low figures of 2009� 
An Insurgency, Criminality, Piracy, and Security Complex 
It is clear, then, that the creeks of the Niger Delta harbor dangerous pirates who 
threaten the security of sea lines of communication in the Gulf of Guinea� Ele-
ments of MEND that are no longer attacking offshore oil platforms, kidnapping 
offshore workers for ransom, or extorting money from oil companies have turned 
to piracy as their principal activity� This insurgency/piracy nexus often exists 
among different kinds of organized crime�47 In the Gulf of Guinea, however, pira-
cy is committed with impunity, and insurgents, rather than achieving a symbiotic 
relationship with pirates, have fully transformed into pirates themselves� 
The crime of piracy is itself only part of a broad spectrum of actions and com-
plexities that constitutes the piracy threat� It may, for instance, be argued that 
dealing with the Niger Delta piracy is a matter of trading off one element of secu-
rity for another� At any point in time—this was especially so prior to the amnesty 
process—the Niger Delta insurgency poses a threat to five critical security inter-
ests: the national security of Nigeria, the investment security of oil companies, 
global energy security, regional security and stability, and finally, the safety and 
security of shipping� These five aspects of security are in many ways interlinked� 
Insurgent activities impact Nigeria’s economic interests and stability, which are 
key components of its national security� Insurgent attacks equally threaten the 
investment interests of oil companies, as well as global energy security, the safety 
and security of shipping, and regional stability� For Nigeria, safeguarding national 
security became paramount following such incidents as the Bonga attack, making 
the security of shipping a lesser concern� Oil companies initially secured their 
investments by succumbing to the extortion demands of insurgent groups�48 The 
amnesty arrangement offered assurance, albeit temporary, of Nigerian national 
security, oil investment security, and by extension, the contribution of Nigeria’s 
oil to global energy security� But protecting those security interests left regional 
security and the security of shipping in peril� That peril may be regarded as unin-
tended, or it can be viewed as Nigeria sacrificing one element of security interest 
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for the other; indeed, as far as the shipping industry was concerned, Nigeria has 
had “no political will to combat the problem of piracy�”49 
EVOLUTION OF THE NIGER DELTA INSURGENCY INTO A  
REGIONAL MARITIME SECURITY THREAT
The Niger Delta insurgency has evolved over time from the primary piracy en-
clave into a region-wide security threat, in scope, tactics, and trends� As in many 
criminal progressions, the exact dates of transitions are difficult to pinpoint but 
the patterns are discernible� What follows is a summary of the seven phases of the 
evolution from 2005 through to the hijacking of Orfeas in October 2012� 
Opportunistic Sea Robbery 
The first phase of Gulf of Guinea piratical attacks may be described as “opportu-
nistic sea robbery�” This taxonomy fits piracy incidents up to 2005 but also applies 
in part as late as 2007� Two-thirds of attacks during this period took place in ports 
and anchorages, interspersed with a limited number of robberies in the territo-
rial sea� It needs to be emphasized, though, that the description of this phase of 
piracy as “opportunistic” is not about the capability of the actors but highlights 
the fact that robberies were conducted as subsidiary activities� The attention of 
insurgents during this period was on attacking offshore platforms; some ships, 
however, were hijacked and crews kidnapped for ransom� 
Piracy reports during this period gave indications of what would become cen-
tral in the profile of threats to SLOC security—that is, gangs of hijackers using 
speedboats armed with heavy weapons� The use of speedboats can be contrasted 
with Somalia piracy, wherein fishing vessels and skiffs are the principal platforms� 
In 2006, four crew members of Northern Comrade were kidnapped for ransom� 
In May 2007, over forty people armed with guns in six speedboats attacked Dlb 
Cheyenne, engaged the Nigerian military in a shoot-out, and kidnapped the crew; 
in the same month Oloibiri was attacked using explosives and its crew kidnapped 
for ransom�50 Thus the tactic of kidnapping and ransoming expatriate oil workers 
was being employed in conjunction with the hijacking of ships� 
Widening the Enclave: Prodding and Surges 
By 2009 there were signs of a new characteristic of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea� 
Unlike Somalia, where pirates set out to hunt for victim ships, pirates in the Gulf 
of Guinea undertake surgical attacks, converging at locations of interest�51 Activi-
ties of insurgents during this period expanded beyond the southern and western 
coasts of Nigeria, westerly swarms targeting vessels off the coast of Benin, and 
those to the south attacking ships off Cameroon and the neighboring coast� In 
2008 about ten armed persons in military clothing boarded the cement carrier 
Elbia off the island of Bioko in Equatorial Guinea, identified themselves as 
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Nigerian rebels, demanded food from the ship’s crew, and after six hours on 
board disembarked into speedboats� Accounts of piracy incidents off nearby 
coasts in 2008 described the pirates and robbers as “Nigerian rebels,” “Nigerian 
militants,” and “protectors of the Bonny River�”52 
These surges signaled an ability of the insurgents to increase the intensity and 
extend the scope of their activities, with widening security consequences� This 
was demonstrated by the alleged involvement of Niger Delta insurgents in a sea-
borne attack on the presidential palace of Equatorial Guinea in February 2009�53 
The incident was the catalyst for the establishment of a subregional maritime 
security framework by member states of the Economic Community of Central 
African States in 2009�54 Despite the challenges confronting the ECCAS mari-
time framework (including inadequate logistics, funding, and legal framework), 
it nonetheless weakened the southern wing of the insurgents, resulting in fewer 
incidents in the southern Gulf of Guinea� 
Pursuit and Violence 
A further evolution of tactics became manifest in 2009 as the insurgents started 
hunting vessels to attack, albeit selectively, but often with great violence� Once a 
high-value target was identified, it was shadowed farther out to sea and at a vul-
nerable location was attacked violently� In February 2009 grenades were thrown 
at the oil tanker Front Chief, killing a crew member� Seamen on board Emirates 
Swam, Sevastopolskaya Buhta, and other vessels also suffered serious injuries 
during attacks the same year�55 The high level of violence not only ensured quick 
outcomes but compensated for the absence of sanctuaries where vessels could be 
kept during ransom negotiations and moved the Gulf of Guinea toward the em-
ployment by pirates of violence and killing to subjugate theaters of operations�56
Full-Scale Insurgent Piracy 
The transition from insurgency into full-scale piracy was a post-amnesty phe-
nomenon, following the withdrawal of insurgent elements from the amnesty deal 
of 2010� Attacks became more prevalent from 2010 through to 2013� They also 
became more brazen, as indicated by the chasing of and firing on Elbtank Ger-
many for over an hour and the shadowing of Cape Bon for two days, in February 
and March 2011, respectively�57 
In this transformation pirates have developed new measures� A variant of the 
mother-ship concept has emerged wherein pirates use hijacked fishing vessels 
to store fuel for extended operations� That is similar to Somali methods, but in 
the Gulf of Guinea it is primarily a deception measure to get close to oil vessels� 
Pirates have targeted especially ships loaded with refined oil, which they always 
siphon into smaller tankers and then sell illegally, both within and outside the 
region�58 
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Regional Threat and Piracy Networks: The Benin Case
That the threat of piracy had become regional by mid-2011 was made evident by 
multiple incidents off the coast of Benin� Piracy off the coast of Benin was by no 
means new, but unlike earlier cases the June–July 2011 attacks amounted to an 
invasion of Benin’s coastal space� The pirates of the Niger Delta had expanded 
their enclave to Benin�59 Two significant trends emerged from the 2011 Benin 
attacks, the first of which defies normal risk analysis regarding the safety and 
security of ships� It is usual to assume that ships in port are shielded from violent 
piracy, and crews normally lower their security posture, expecting at most only 
minor robberies and minimal violence by actors from within the coastal state� 
This assumption was crushed when pirates of the Niger Delta actually entered 
port areas of Benin to hijack vessels. One ship, Aristofanis, was sailed to the open 
sea, where its cargo was discharged�60 
The second piracy trend that became apparent in the Benin onslaught was the 
emergence of a growing transnational criminal network in the Gulf of Guinea� 
This is evident from the hijacking of Duzgit Venture�61 The captain was forced 
to sail the vessel all the way to the coast of Gabon, where the pirates planned to 
transfer the oil into a barge� When the pirates failed to meet the barge, the captain 
was forced to sail off Warri, Nigeria, to lighter the cargo� After a series of unsuc-
cessful attempts to do so, the pirates disembarked into fast boats, kidnapping the 
captain and another crew member� The pirates were in cahoots with other actors 
about four thousand kilometers away from the point of hijack, and to meet them 
they sailed the commandeered ship across the coastal waters of five states�62 The 
incident also raises serious question about the capability of Gulf of Guinea states 
to monitor their maritime domains� 
Togo in the Claws: Post–Operation PROSPERITY
The multiple piracy attacks off the coast of Benin had a staggering economic im-
pact on the country, including an estimated port-revenue loss of U�S�$81 million 
in 2011�63 The president of Benin took two diplomatic steps in response to the 
crisis� At the multilateral level, he requested the support of the international com-
munity, through the United Nations secretary-general�64 Second, he sought the 
support of his counterpart in Nigeria�65 In August 2011 the two states launched 
joint patrols; known as Operation PROSPERITY, they lasted a year and concen-
trated largely on the coast of Benin� Benin had operational command over the 
patrols, while tactical command was exercised by Nigeria�66
Within months, a UN report indicated that Operation PROSPERITY had led to 
a reduction in piratical incidents off the coast of Benin�67 This was corroborated 
by the military chief of Benin�68 However, the fundamental question that should 
have been asked was, What has been the effect of PROSPERITY on the immediate 
regions of Nigeria and Benin? 
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Since the launch of Operation PROSPERITY there has been, on the one hand, a 
steady decrease in piracy off the coast of Benin, but on the other hand, an emer-
gence of incidents off the Togolese coast�69 Interestingly, attacks off the Togolese 
coast coincide with periods of few or none reported off Nigeria and Benin� Some 
have occurred deep inside port areas of Togo, like the earlier attacks in Benin� 
The IMB has noted that the Togo coast has become a piracy hot spot, with inci-
dents increasing from a single attack in 2008 to fifteen in 2012�70 This indicates 
that Operation PROSPERITY had simply pushed pirates and robbers farther to the 
west� The short coastlines of Benin and Togo have allowed pirates to treat the two 
coasts tactically as a single theater of operations� This can be inferred from two 
reported incidents in September 2011�71 On the 14th, at 4:15 am, armed robbers 
attacked Abu Dhabi Star, a Singapore-flagged chemical tanker, a few nautical 
miles off Lomé, Togo, but aborted the attack upon being noticed by the ship’s 
company� Four hours earlier, at 11:52 pm, two gangs of pirates had hijacked two 
tankers, Mattheos I and Northern Bell, that were conducting a ship-to-ship trans-
fer, sixty-two nautical miles off Benin� The pirates succeeded in sailing Mattheos 
I to an unknown location, but the crew of Northern Bell regained control of their 
ship� 
Analysis of these two incidents, taking into account time, location, and dis-
tance, suggests that the same gang of Niger Delta pirates that lost control of 
Northern Bell off the Benin coast sailed toward Togo, and then paid their preda-
tory visit to Abu Dhabi Star� The IMB subsequently confirmed that Nigerian 
pirates have expanded into Togolese waters�72 
Cote d’Ivoire under Siege: Nowhere Is Safe 
The hijacking of Orfeas in October 2012 marked the seventh phase of the evolu-
tion of piracy from a primary enclave in the Niger Delta into a well-entrenched 
regional threat� Orfeas was hijacked on 6 October 2012 off the coast of Cote 
d’Ivoire�73 Gaining control of the vessel, the pirates sailed it over two thousand 
kilometers to the Niger Delta and stole the oil cargo, releasing the vessel two days 
later�74 The hijacking encapsulates most of the tactics already discussed but also 
brings to the fore the new sophistication of Gulf of Guinea piracy� Soon after the 
hijacking, the pirates took the vessel into deeper water, both to make contact with 
their criminal networks and to put the ship out of reach of rescue� In December 
2012, armed pirates with machine guns attacked another oil tanker in a Cote 
d’Ivoire port�75 These incidents show that attacks in the western Gulf of Guinea 
have become more brazen� 
EMERGENT PROFILE AND FUTURE PROJECTION 
This seven-phase evolution shows that in the absence of robust responses the pi-
rates are likely to consolidate and expand their activities� Effective counterpiracy 
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action must take into account the modus operandi of pirates, the piracy profile, 
and emerging trends� By the close of 2012, the evolving piracy profile of the Niger 
Delta pirates had crystallized, as summarized in table 2� 
The above profile reflects a primary focus on the Niger Delta� However, Gulf 
of Guinea piratical activity is now marked by fluidity and increasing complexity� 
Effective responses should therefore assume the scope of the broader maritime 
security context, with particular attention on the evolving piracy track and crimi-
nal networks� The following trends should be closely watched�
Widening of the Niger Delta Factor 
Unlike Somalia, where multilateral counterpiracy efforts have led to a steady de-
cline in successful attacks since 2009, the Gulf of Guinea has seen an escalation�76 
This suggests that pirates in the region are mastering its geography and shipping 
profile� Distance is not a limiting factor for piratical activities; conversely, long-
range attacks give pirates more time to plunder ships and transfer stolen cargo� 
Clearly, there is no area in the Gulf of Guinea too remote or too secure for piracy� 
Indeed, in the primary piracy enclave we see two mutually reinforcing devel-
opments: consolidation and further widening� It is logical for the Niger Delta 
pirates to continue to view the coasts of Nigeria, Benin, and Togo as their normal 
Subject Description/Outcome 
Platforms Speedboats, already used by insurgents� Ideal for piracy because of their speed and maneuverability� 
Generally faster than victim ships and naval ships�
Grouping Up to forty pirates in multiple speedboats� Large numbers ideal for overpowering crews�
Weapons AK-47s, machine guns, RPGs, grenades, and knives� Able to stop ships under way with firepower�
Violence High level of violence and injury to crew� Instills fear and ensures quick outcome of attacks�
Reach/range Southward: Nigeria to Equatorial Guinea (over 1,550 km)� Westward: Nigeria to Cote d’Ivoire (over 
2,000 km)�
Time Operate day and night but shifting more to night operations� Surprise achieved through night  
attack�
Target ships Oil and product tankers; objective to steal refined oil cargo� Other vessels attacked for money and 
valuables�
Mother ship Hijacked fishing vessels occasionally used as resupply basis or as decoy when approaching targeted 
ships�
Assisting ships Tankers used to transfer stolen oil cargo�
Ransom Increasingly not a prime motivation but still employed as a supplementary activity�
Networks Stolen oil sold within and outside the region� Timing of attacks suggests prior information about 
locations of oil tankers�
TABLE 2
PROFILE OF GULF OF GUINEA PIRACY AS OF 2012
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zone while they venture into new areas� This new dynamic was unleashed in Jan-
uary 2014, with the hijacking of Kerala in Angola�77 The tanker was subsequently 
sighted under the control of the hijackers off the coast of Nigeria, where part of 
the oil cargo, worth eight million U�S� dollars, was stolen�78 This incident signified 
a southerly expansion of piracy attacks� The months of June and July saw three 
hijackings off Ghana, two of them of oil tankers, signifying a further enlargement 
of piracy threat, this time westward�79 These attacks shattered the reputations of 
Angola and Ghana as having coast waters among the safest in the region� The in-
cidents also demonstrated that oil tankers will continue to be targeted, because the 
financial rewards for the pirates and their accomplices, as well as for buyers of the 
stolen oil, are extremely high�80 However, all other vessels are also susceptible prey� 
Other Piratical Groups within the Primary Piracy Enclave 
But even the primary piracy enclave can get  more complicated� There is a history 
of attacks by two organized groups in neighboring Cameroon that are completely 
removed from the Niger Delta insurgency� One, the Bakassi Freedom Fighters 
(BFF), is opposed to Nigeria’s return of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon�81 The 
BFF attacked an oil tanker in 2008, kidnapping the crew and detaining them for 
ten days before negotiating a ransom payment�82 The second group, the Africa 
Marine Commando (AMC), kidnapped a Chinese fishing crew in 2010 and ex-
torted a ransom for their release�83 There have been no other discernible piratical 
attacks by the BFF or the AMC, partly because of robust responses from the 
Cameroon government, including lethal force�84 However, the groups are far from 
being dismantled; reports indicate that the AMC was involved in the kidnapping 
of local officials in 2011�85 
Concerns in the Secondary Piracy Enclave 
Another concern is the future safety of the coasts of Guinea and Sierra Leone� 
Incidents in this enclave are fewer than off the Niger Delta but worrisome be-
cause of the high level of violence employed� There is also a very close correlation 
between reported piracy off the coast of Guinea and incidents in neighboring 
Sierra Leone—a portent of organized criminal activity in the latter area� In March 
2007, pirates armed with machine guns boarded Atropos, which was under way 
forty nautical miles off Sierra Leone�86 In August of the same year, thirty pirates 
armed with guns boarded a United Kingdom–registered product tanker off 
Guinea�87 That December pirates armed with AK-47s and wearing military-like 
uniforms fired on and boarded a tanker off Sierra Leone�88 In August 2010, ten 
pirates armed with AK-47s attacked a ship off the coast of Guinea;89 more recent-
ly, in 2012, a Maltese cargo ship, Costanza, was attacked twenty nautical miles 
off Guinea by pirates, again armed with AK-47s, damaging the ship�90 These are 
indications of entrenched piratical activity in this secondary enclave� 
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Threats beyond Piracy 
While the Gulf of Guinea grapples with a spate of piratical activity, new transna-
tional actors are gaining notoriety in the region� The Nigerian extremist Islamist 
group Boko Haram, whose activities were previously confined to the northern 
part of the country, has broadened its operations across Nigeria and neighboring 
states�91 In August 2011, the group claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on 
the United Nations office in Nigeria, killing eighteen staff and injuring over a 
hundred others�92 This attack dramatically changed earlier assessments that had 
viewed the group’s threat as limited�93 In June 2013, following repeated attacks 
on major cities and towns, the government of Nigeria officially declared Boko 
Haram a terrorist group;94 the Nigerian minister of defense emphatically de-
scribed it as a franchise of Al Qaeda�95 
To date, there have been no reports of maritime attacks by Boko Haram� Al-
though a strike on an onshore pipeline in February 2012 by militants “want[ing] 
to register their presence” raised fears that Boko Haram may have been targeting 
strategic oil assets, no connection with it has been established�96 Nevertheless, 
the possibility of Boko Haram or another terrorist group, such as Al Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), targeting offshore oil and gas installations in the Gulf 
of Guinea cannot be discounted�97 Indeed, the high value of these assets, coupled 
with their vulnerability, makes them attractive targets�98 
COUNTERPIRACY IMPERATIVES 
This article has established an increasing threat of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea� 
As attacks spread southward from the secondary enclave in Guinea, a piracy arc 
reaching to the primary enclave of the Niger Delta will be formed, leading to a 
very grave situation for the safety of shipping, offshore energy security, and the 
stability of the region� Effective remedial measures must be adopted by regional 
states and the international community� In designing these measures lessons 
from recent multilateral efforts in Somalia would certainly be useful, but cogni-
zance should also be given to the distinctive dynamics of this new theater� On the 
whole, five thematic areas must be addressed� 
Improved Governance 
The governance nexus with piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is important� The con-
sequence of a governance deficit goes beyond the spiral of piratical attacks being 
witnessed� It also finds expression in a myriad of maritime security challenges, in-
cluding illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing and illegal migration by sea�99 
The 2006 UN Niger Delta Human Development Report provides an incisive 
description of the conditions of the people of the Niger Delta�100 The report notes 
that the region has “dismal health and health service delivery,” that the people live 
in “predominantly � � � poor quality [housing],” and that nearly all school facilities 
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are in “a state of extreme disrepair�” It reports increasing “disillusionment and 
frustration,” as well as “deepening � � � deprivation and environmental devasta-
tion�”101 Research suggests that the quantity of oil spilled in the Niger Delta over 
the last fifty years is more than fifty times the volume spilled in the Exxon Valdez 
accident of 1989—one of the greatest environmental disasters the world has ever 
witnessed�102 Such poor environmental management has led to serious pollution 
and environmental degradation, limiting the opportunity of people to earn a liv-
ing from either farming or fishing�103
Realistically, therefore, bad governance must be said to lie at the heart of the 
maritime security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea� Considering the tremendous 
oil wealth generated by the Niger Delta region, the dismal social picture painted 
by the UN report is otherwise difficult to comprehend� Resentment would be at 
its height in such an environment, leading to restiveness, conflict, and crime�104 In 
any case, poor governance creates a malignant environment that can be exploited 
by pirates and transnational criminal networks�105 
Enhanced Capability 
The impunity with which ship hijackings are conducted in the Gulf of Guinea, at 
times deep inside ports, is symptomatic of weakness in policing, surveillance, and 
response capabilities�106 Although security-sector funding is generally inadequate 
in the Gulf of Guinea, the situation with respect to navies and coast guards is 
especially problematic� Angola’s allocation of resources for the protection of 
its maritime estate is typical for Gulf of Guinea states� Angola has an estimated 
coastline of 1,600 kilometers—the longest in the region� Its gross domestic 
product is the second highest in the region, much of it derived from offshore 
resources� Yet the personnel strength of the Angolan navy is only a thousand 
(compared to a hundred thousand for Angola’s army and six thousand for its air 
force), and its equipment state is palpably inadequate, in contrast to that of the 
army�107 The Nigerian navy is similarly underfunded and limited in capability�108 
Its personnel strength of eight thousand is the largest in the Gulf of Guinea but 
in sharp contrast to the sixty-two-thousand-strong Nigerian army�109 Liberia 
represents another anomaly, not just for the Gulf of Guinea but with respect 
to how the global maritime community as a whole matches responsibility with 
maritime interest� Although Liberia is the second-largest flag state in the world, 
its diminutive coast guard has only fifty personnel and eight craft, all under ten 
feet in length�110 
A quick glance at the other navies and coast guards reveals a similarly 
worrisome situation�111 It is evident that the maritime jurisdiction and interest 
available to Gulf of Guinea states are not commensurate with the exercise of 
responsibility to ensure the safety and security of their coasts�112 This capability 
gap must be addressed� 
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Effective Legal Framework 
An inadequate legal framework too undermines maritime security in the Gulf 
of Guinea� Article 100 of UNCLOS encapsulates two interrelated obligations 
regarding piracy� States are required, first, to suppress piracy at the national level, 
and second, to cooperate with other states in that effort at the regional and in-
ternational levels�113 To give practical effect to the former, Gulf of Guinea states 
must enact and enforce laws covering all aspects of the crime of piracy�114 With 
respect to the second obligation, cooperative instruments and structures should 
be established that facilitate the sharing of information, at the minimum, and also 
possibly lead to joint patrols� 
However, Liberia and Togo are the only states in the region that have up-to-
date piracy legislation�115 It was only in January 2013 that Nigeria initiated the 
process of enacting a law to combat piracy and other maritime crimes�116 A UN 
assessment mission observed that the definition in the national laws of Benin 
of the crime of piracy was outdated and inconsistent with the provisions of 
UNCLOS�117 In summary, there is a legislative deficit with respect to the crime 
of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea� Thus, even were states able to patrol their coasts, 
they would be unable to prosecute or punish offenders� The likely result would 
be a “catch and release syndrome,” as was manifested in the early periods of So-
mali piracy when counterpiracy forces frequently released apprehended pirates 
because of difficulties in prosecution, thus further entrenching insecurity�118 The 
Gulf of Guinea states must therefore create an effective counterpiracy regime, 
first passing laws against piracy, with accompanying penalties, and second, pro-
viding the necessary prosecution and judicial structures� 
A related important global instrument is the Convention for the Suppres-
sion of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988 (known 
as the 1988 SUA Convention), and its protocols�119 The 1988 SUA Convention 
established a basis for responding to a spectrum of violent crimes at sea, from 
insurgency to terrorism�120 These crimes tend to fall outside the scope of piracy 
as defined by UNCLOS�121 The 1988 SUA Convention has addressed such gaps, 
giving Gulf of Guinea states the opportunity to respond effectively to these 
threats� 
Despite the relevance of the SUA regime, ratification and implementation of 
SUA instruments by Gulf of Guinea states have been unsatisfactory� Only Cote 
d’Ivoire is a party to all the SUA instruments, but only since 2012�122 Angola, 
Cameroon, Republic of the Congo, Gabon, and Nigeria—all of them major oil-
producing states with substantial offshore infrastructures—have not ratified the 
1988 SUA Fixed Platform Protocol� States that have ratified SUA instruments 
have generally failed to incorporate them into their domestic legal systems�123 
For example, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria have all ratified the 1988 
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SUA Convention, but not one has incorporated the convention into its national 
law�124 Since 2004 the UN has emphasized the importance of the SUA framework 
for maritime security�125 It is therefore imperative that Gulf of Guinea states 
ratify and implement the SUA instruments within their domestic legal and 
policy frameworks� They should then develop regional responses, on the SUA 
framework� 
Robust Regional Cooperation
Maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea is increasing; however, it 
is crucial that initiatives be tailored to meet the needs of the region� Member 
states of the ECCAS in 2009 adopted a Protocol on Maritime Security, based on 
a structure that divides the ECCAS grouping into zones to enhance joint patrol, 
monitoring, and enforcement�126 This structure is being replicated for the entire 
Gulf of Guinea as part of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct� For instance, ECOWAS 
member states decided to establish a pilot Zone E, comprising Nigeria, Benin, 
Togo, and the landlocked state of Niger�127 However, a number of issues have to 
be addressed: information sharing, realistic funding, interoperability, and current 
and future maritime boundary disputes�128
Viable International Cooperation 
International maritime security cooperation too has gained traction in the 
Gulf of Guinea; the United States has achieved a good deal of visibility in this 
regard� The United States launched its Africa Partnership Station (APS) in 2007 
with the deployment of the catamaran HSV-2 Swift and the dock landing ship 
USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) to the Gulf of Guinea, and there has since been a 
consistent APS presence in the region�129 While serving as a platform for capacity 
building and joint exercises, the APS also contributes to the strategic objectives 
of power projection and cooperative engagement for the United States through 
the U�S� Africa Command (AFRICOM)�130 Other U�S� government and policy 
institutions, including the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, at Fort McNair in 
Washington, D�C�, are also engaged in meeting nonmilitary maritime-security 
needs of the Gulf of Guinea� 
The European Union launched the Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf 
of Guinea (CRIMGO) project in January 2013�131 The initiative is designed to 
improve safety and security off the coasts of seven states�132 Several other states 
as well are keenly engaged with the Gulf of Guinea on maritime security, as 
epitomized by the increasing port visits of foreign navies in the last couple of 
years�133 Even the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy, which traditionally 
has had no presence in the region, visited Cameroon in May 2014 and reportedly 
undertook antipiracy joint drills with the host country�134 At the multilateral level, 
both the International Maritime Organization and the United Nations Office 
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on Drugs and Crime have maritime security capacity-building programs in the 
Gulf of Guinea� There is also an initiative by the international police community 
(INTERPOL) focused on the investigation of maritime-security incidents�135 This 
will be a useful means of unearthing patterns of maritime crime and criminal 
networks� 
Although international cooperation holds out the prospect of enhancing 
maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, a number of challenges have to be 
addressed, of which two deserve highlighting here� First is the need for coordina-
tion of international partnerships� Multiple cooperative initiatives are currently 
being unpacked in the region that national administrators and regional institu-
tions are required to respond to and then implement� They overcrowd national 
and regional policy, adversely affecting maritime-security decision making and 
coordination� External actors, donor agencies, and relevant international orga-
nizations should instead engage with Gulf of Guinea states in a harmonized, co-
ordinated way� Second, while maritime security cooperation is arguably a means 
for nonregional states to pursue wider strategic interests, some have made no 
allocation of logistical support or funds corresponding to the maritime-security 
needs of the region� For example, France pledged only U�S�$1�6 million to sup-
port maritime security in 2013, while funding for the CRIMGO project is just 
€4�5 million�136 This amounts to a fraction of the annual cost of the Nigerian-
Benin joint patrols (Operation PROSPERITY), estimated by the UN at U�S�$112 
million�137 
Given the socioeconomic realities in the Gulf of Guinea, where many states 
are at the bottom of the global development index, external partnerships should 
contribute substantially to the enhancement of capacity and capability�138 An ar-
rangement similar to the trust fund established under the auspices of the IMO 
to facilitate counterpiracy initiatives in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden 
is recommended for the Gulf of Guinea�139 Of course, the prevailing governance 
nemesis in the region makes such a fund susceptible to corruption and abuse� 
The framework must therefore have inbuilt mechanisms and checks to ensure 
the transparent and efficient application of the fund� 
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